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I. Introduction
Male intimate violence is a constant in the lives of women and the
community. We have recognized the effect of such violence on individual
women, but have failed to adequately assess the impact on members of the
community. Indeed, we still think of male intimate violence as the
consequence of individual acts by individual men, shielded by a veil of
familial privacy. Notwithstanding our protestations to the contrary, we, as a
society, do not consider such violence as inimical to our survival. It is and
has been viewed as significant only to the perpetrator and the survivor. As
a result, the collective, the "We," are not invested in abating or contesting
either the violence or the violator.
This may seem like a rather harsh or inaccurate assessment. It is harsh
because it appears to discount the dedication of advocates who labor in
political trenches attempting to shape public attitudes and policies; it is
inaccurate given the plethora of statutory mandates that abound in state law.
But the truth is, violence against women by male intimate partners is very
much alive and very much ignored.
The question is why?
There are myriad reasons ranging from the psychological distance that
such violence produces to the fear associated with involvement in
preventing a crime. Undeniably, because of the frequency of such violence,
women need psychological distance so as not to see themselves as potential
victims; all of us fear being victimized by violent criminals, and batterers
engender such fear, in neighbors, passers-by, and community members.
But what I am referring to is a systemic denial of collective responsibility,
reflected in such cases as Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales' and Burella v.
City of Philadelphia.2 And this is the subject of this article.
In Part II, I introduce mandates by acquainting the reader with the
historical context that birthed such statutes as mandatory arrest and
mandatory reporting by doctors to law enforcement in battered women's
1. 545 U.S. 748, 760-62 (2005) (failing to make enforcement of restraining orders
mandatory and holding that the Colorado Legislature failed to create a Fourteenth
Amendment property interest in the enforcement of an order of protection); see also infra
Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes (highlighting the presumed deficiencies of the Castle
Rock opinion).
2. 501 F.3d 134, 134 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that Burella did not have a procedural
or substantive due process right to have officers enforce an order of protection); see also
infra Part III.A.3 (suggesting that "[i]n one opinion, the 14th Amendment in its entirety has
been foreclosed to battered women and their children; Legislative enactment be damned").
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cases. 3  These mandates were supported by the Battered Women's
Movement (BWM) because they placed male intimate violence on the
political radar screen. Mandatory arrest was viewed by the BWM as a
3. By 1992, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and
Wisconsin had passed legislation mandating arrest for domestic violence. R. EMERSON
DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 169 (1992). The
majority of states passed mandatory arrest laws in 1994. Most provisions were drafted with
mandatory arrest language and a concept of the batterer regardless of sex, but arrest records
would show that most batterers were male and most victims were female. "[T]he following
states mandate arrest when there is probable cause to believe that a violation of a protection
order has occurred": Alaska, California, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice:
Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1855
n.42 (2002); see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(2) (Michie 2002); CAL. PENAL CODE §
836(c) (West Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5 (2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
403.760(2) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E) (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 4-509(b) (Supp. 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 1998);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15b (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01, subd. 14(e)
(West Supp. 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(2) (West 2003); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §
33.070(1) (Michie Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a)(3) (West 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-6(C) (Michie 1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4) (McKinney 2004) (to
be repealed Sept. 1, 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-11(1) (2004); OHno REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2935.03(B)(3) (Anderson 2003) (suggesting but not mandating arrest); OR. REV. STAT. §
133.310(3) (2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113(a) (West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
23A-3-2.1(1) (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a) (2001); TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 14.03(a)(3), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
36-2.4(1) (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(a) (West Supp. 2002); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 48-27-1001(a) (Michie 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(7)(b) (West Supp.
2004).
The following states currently employ a pro-arrest standard when there is domestic
violence regardless of whether a protection order has been violated: Alaska, Arizona,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.
Epstein, supra, at 1855 n. 42; see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(1) (Michie 2002); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West
2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a) (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2) (West 2000)
(requiring actual or intended injury to the victim before mandating arrest); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2140 (West Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4012(6)(D) (West
1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 1998) (characterizing arrest as a
"preferred response" in the absence of a protection order); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a)(l)
(West 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4) (McKinney 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2935.03(B)(3)(b) (Anderson 2003) (preferring arrest in response to domestic violence); OR.
REV. STAT. § 133.310(6) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(2) (Michie Supp. 2003);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (allowing, but not
mandating, arrest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.31.100(2)(c) (West Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1002 (Michie 2004)
(allowing, but not mandating, arrest).
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statement of women's equality before the law with the survivor worthy of
state protection and the perpetrator worthy of collective condemnation.4
Because the law enforcement community effectively ignored violence
against women, the BWM made criminal justice reform a key strategic
component of their political agenda.5 Indeed, the Judiciary Committee of
the United States Senate concluded that law enforcement's refusal to treat
male intimate violence as a crime perpetuated such violence against
women.6 The Judiciary Committee was kind; I would argue that police
arrest avoidance operates collaboratively with the assailant in continuing
such violence against women.
Part III discusses the legal disconnect between public policy and
enforcement of mandates. The courts have done immeasurable violence to
statutory schemes, which attempt to locate state accountability. DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services7 laid the ground work
for Castle Rock and Burella, whose combined effect is the annihilation of
all things mandatory. Why? Because the absence of accountability renders
"shall enforce" unenforceable. And unenforceable mandates create an
illusion of protection which is worse than no protection at all.
The neutering of mandates is not confined to Constitutional torts. The
denuding of mandates' power is further accomplished when we shield the
state from accountability by blocking suits in common law negligence
claims. Thus, the courthouse door is closed to battered women regardless
of whether we are referencing constitutional claims or state tort claims
against the state. Part III makes clear the demise of mandates.
4. There was not as much support for mandatory reporting by doctors to law
enforcement because advocates believed that such a requirement was unenforceable and
could be a barrier to women seeking needed medical attention. Indeed, only seven states
have a proviso specifically requiring reporting to law enforcement in reporting statutes. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. See Task Force on Family Violence, Behind Closed Doors: The City's Response
To Family Violence (Office of New York Manhattan Borough President 1993) [hereinafter
Messinger Report] (criticizing New York City's ineffective response to domestic violence
and concluding that the system for helping battered women is putting them in further
danger).
6. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1993, S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993) [hereinafter VAWA
SENATE REPORT 1993] ("[I]n over 85 percent of the family violence cases.., police did not
arrest her abuser. Moreover, family violence accounts for a significant number of murders
in this country. One-third of all women who are murdered die at the hands of a husband or
boyfriend.").
7. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
408
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In Part IV, I analyze the failure of the BWM to address the issues
raised by Deshaney, Castle Rock and Burella. There is neither a regional
nor national discussion on the issue of male intimate violence, mandates
and state accountability. It is stunning that a recent U.S. Supreme Court
case and a Third Circuit Court case have failed to raise either the ire or
political voice of the BWM. In Part IV, I argue that this result is a direct
consequence of one fact-there is no viable BWM as we move into the mid
twenty-first century. There is no doubt that individual advocates, shelter
programs, and coalitions are still fighting the good fight. But what is
lacking is a cogent, cohesive, national, political strategy that can evolve
from and devolve to localities to form a movement.
Part V, the conclusion, ends the article with a warning, a lamentation,
and a hopeful trope. I cannot accept the political and legal terrain
constructed by the courts and our collective silence.8 It is beyond
comprehension that the Colorado Coalition Against Domestic Violence has
refused to address the void left by Castle Rock, a case which is home
grown, right here in Colorado. In Part V, I argue that the BWM needs to
find its moral compass and return to its political and social roots so as to
rebuild a movement that is once again a voice for those who are voiceless.
II. The Battered Women's Movement, Mandates, and a Feminist Vision of
Equality
Any student of social movements knows that the BWM is an
outgrowth of the second wave of feminism. Indeed, when I taught
Womens Studies and Political Theory at the University of New
York, I used the BWM as a prism through which to pass all things
feminist, as students learned about power, politics, and patriarchy.
And not unlike the women's liberation movement of the 1960s, the
BWM was as varied as it was distinct because it infused a voice
into the politics of the '60s that had been silenced-the voice of
women.
9
8. By our, I am referring to the BWM. I am and have been a part of this movement
for over 20 years and I hold myself accountable for our failures, of which this silence is the
most devastating.
9. See generally SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTICS OF SEX (1970) (critiquing
the SDS and SNCC movements as anti-female and overtly sexist.)
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The BWM was "woman-identified,"' radical, strategic, and
intensely political." Consonant with the reproductive rights strand
of the Women's Liberation Movement, the heart of the BWM's
politics was eradication of male intimate violence and reassertion
of women's bodily integrity.' 2  Bodily integrity meant being free
from violence, perpetrated by individual men and by a culture
steeped in misogynistic beliefs.' 3 It is important to remember that
gender-motivated violence, such as male intimate violence or
sexual assault, reflected a cultural belief system that subordinated
the body as well as the rights of women to both patriarch and
10. By woman-identified, I am not referring to Lesbianism, although most of the
movers and shakers in the nascent BWM were in fact lesbians. I am referring to what
Adrienne Rich referred to as women-identified women, which means having one's primary
allegiance to women. Who one "bedded," was important but not the defining characteristic
of "women-identification." And while many feminist legal scholars locate women-identified
as central to Catherine MacKinnon's writings, her analysis is derivative, flowing from the
early radical lesbian feminist theorists such as Charlotte Bunch, Adrienne Rich, Judith
Butler, and Shulamith Firestone.
11. See generally SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982). See also G. Kristian Miccio, A
House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence and the Conservatization of the
Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237 (2005) (examining the BWM and the
conservative ideological position that has shaped movement strategy and politics since the
early 1980s).
12. All law review articles have an annoying, if not distracting tradition, that of a
plethora of footnotes. This tradition is about grounding our ideas in "authority," meaning
something outside of the author's own thoughts so as to give legitimacy to our arguments
and ideas. External authority not only demonstrates familiarity with well-worn ideas but
confers authenticity on an author's beliefs. This article will not follow this tradition. The
authenticity of my ideas, and I dare say their value, flows from memory. I am a member of
the movement that I critique. And, as we say in law, I have first-hand knowledge of the
events that I write about because I lived in the eye of the storm, shaped by the politics of the
'60s, forged in the battles for liberation, as women, as gays, and as ethnic minorities.
Consequently, much of what is written in Part II will be drawn from memory and from
political experiences that shaped those memories.
13. See ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 2-47 (rev. ed., 1990) (maintaining that the
principles of bodily integrity and self-determination are essential to the historical feminist
view of reproductive freedom); Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, The Body as Property: A
Feminist Re-vision, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
REPRODUCTION 387 (Faye D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp eds., 1995) (tracing the development
of women's sense of "self-ownership" across various cultures and time periods). Cf Sharon
Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention, in
FEMINIST THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 385, 398-400 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992)
(rejecting the views that champion women's proprietary rights in their bodies and arguing
that such beliefs actually reinforce a definition of female sexuality as "violable property" and
promote further violations of women).
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Patriarchy. This is Feminism 101, regardless of whether one
viewed herself as a liberal, socialist, or radical feminist. Clearly,
race, class, and sexual identity combine with sex to restrict access
to full citizenship and to the rights inherent in our being human.
But to the foremothers of the second wave of feminism, misogyny
was the nucleus of women's oppression, and such misogyny was
located in both culture and law.
The primacy of "sex" as a political category was radical in and of
itself. Why? Because the liberation movements of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries lacked a gender/sex analysis, whether the movement
addressed the needs of workers, people of color, the poor, or sexual
minorities. The yardstick was maleness, and although women were 50% of
any group, the focus was on men. We were invisible.
The Women's Liberation and the Battered Women's Movements
changed this.
The BWM made women's experience in the home an authentic
political truth. Indeed the personal, shielded from public view by the veil
of familial privacy, was political. The Women's Liberation Movement and
the BWM transformed how we viewed not only the family but the very
nature of violence. Patriarchal power in the family combined with violence
against wives was a powerful method of social control. As MacKinnon
notes, male intimate violence was merely the exercise of power granted to
men because of their status (husband) and their sex (male). 14  To the
skeptic, I ask how else do we explain social acceptance of male intimate
violence? How else do we justify the verity of the marital rape exemption,
legally incapacitating wives from withholding consent to sex? 15 To the
early feminists, the public nature of private violence was both evident and
worthy of collective concern.
14. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 42-44
(1989) (referencing John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women and discussing the power
dynamics of male-female relationships).
15. John Stuart Mill recognized that the marriage certificate gave husbands license to
physically and sexually abuse their wives. He wrote in 1859, "The state, while it respects
the liberty of each in what specifically regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant
control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. This
obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of family relations .... The almost
despotic power of husbands over wives need not be enlarged upon .... " JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY & OTHER ESSAYS 113, 116 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859);
see also ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 35 (1987); People v. Liberta, 64
N.Y.2d 152 (N.Y. 1984) (declaring that the marital rape exemption in New York's penal law
violated due process under the New York Constitution).
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In the mid to late 1960s, advocates were aware of what I have termed
"police arrest avoidance" (PAA). PAA occurs when police refuse to
exercise discretion, preferring instead to treat all domestic violence cases
the same, regardless of injury, by not arresting the perpetrator. And this
"option" was policy not merely practice. Moreover, by the 1970s, the
family courts-the usual forum for domestic violence cases-"had reduced
these criminal assaults to problems of individual or social pathology."' 6
Not only did courts' individuate the violence, but they viewed it as the fault
of women.
1 7
Social pathology gained currency within law enforcement. The Law
Enforcement and Assistance Administration (LEAA) created six model
projects to train officers in "crisis intervention" to respond to domestic
violence calls. 18 The therapeutic professionals who designed the training
and who urged crisis intervention believed that most cases involving
intimate violence were in fact devoid of violence.' 9 Such incidents were
viewed as "family squabbles," where the male partner was emasculated by
the female partner.2° Officers were to take on the role of "counselors and
mediators, trained in the skills of crisis intervention.",2' Arrest was
perceived as totally inappropriate.
Training manuals, supported by LEAA money and used by the police,
reinforced both sexist and ethnic stereotypes about who battered and why.
As Dobash points out, women were depicted as "depressed, menopausal,
dominating and 'likely to resort to physical violence."'2 2 And use of
physical force was depicted as common in certain ethnic groups.23
Because the police historically treated male intimate violence as a
private matter, the new protocols reinscribed a dangerous methodology that
flattened the topography of the violence. Mediation, counseling, and
16. R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 169 (1992).
17. See id. at 155-56 (stating that one English magistrate went so far as to conclude
that "the men who appeared before him for beating their wives were often 'tortured and
taunted to the verge of madness' by women, and he indicted [sic] that it was only
understandable that they should use violence").
18. Id. at 157.
19. See id. at 161-63 (finding that LEAA training resources taught police officers to
conclude that most domestic disputes were nonviolent because the proponents of crisis
intervention viewed these occurrences as "rarely involv[ing] violence").
20. Id. at 161.
21. Id. at 163.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 159.
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diversion from the criminal justice system were the only responses by the
police, regardless of the degree of violence perpetrated by the offender.
Absent a loss of human life, crisis intervention and mediation were the only
tools in the state's arsenal to address intimate violence. The "new"
professional response, conflating police practices with psychological
theory, legitimized traditional police behavior.
With the institution of the LEAA project, PAA was transformed into a
viable strategy supported by a segment of the psychoanalytic profession and
adopted by law enforcement policy makers. Arrest was not only not the
preferred course of action, it was antithetical to what constituted
appropriate state (police) action.24 As a consequence, perpetrators were
given a walk around the block, allowed to return home to terrorize again
and again. Women and children were relegated to the shadows, destined to
suffer in silence, outside the view and concern of the public. Against this
backdrop, advocates raised the issue of statutory mandates.
In the 1970's a series of cases illustrated PAA. In New York,
advocates sued the New York City Police Department, the Probation
Department and the Family Courts.25 The basis of this class action suit was
not only PAA but also the failure of the courts and law enforcement to treat
male intimate violence as a crime, worthy of state condemnation. Three
thousand miles across the United States, in California, Oakland advocates
filed suit against the police claiming that law enforcement was refusing to
arrest perpetrators of male intimate violence.26 These cases raised the issue
24. See id. at 161 ("Arrest was inappropriate for solving the complex social and
psychological problems evident in these non-violent 'family squabbles."'). By 1977, 70% of
large police departments-those with one hundred staff members or more-were training
police in crisis intervention. Id. at 162.
25. See Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979) (alleging a practice of
discrimination and misconduct by the New York City Policy Department for its failure to
enforce controlling statutes and regulations against "wife beating").
26. Scott v. Hart, No. C76-2395 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 28, 1976) (describing a
challenge that ultimately led to a settlement with police regarding the nonintervention of
Oakland law enforcement in male intimate violence cases); Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 120
Cal. Rptr. 5, 7 (Ct. App. 1975) (dismissing a complaint against the City of San Jose police
department for wrongful death because the department enjoys absolute immunity). Cf
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528-29 (D. Conn. 1984) (denying the
city's motion to dismiss). The court stated:
A man is not allowed to... abuse ... a woman merely because he is her
husband. Concomitantly, a police officer may not knowingly refrain from
interference in such violence, and may not "automatically decline to make an
arrest [solely] because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other."
Id. (quoting Bruno, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 976).
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of mandatory arrest as one strategy to contest the conscious disregard that
had been institutionalized in the court and law enforcement systems.
It is important to note that mandatory arrest was a strategy, not the sole
strategy of the BWM. Indeed, advocates understood that the collective
response to male intimate violence was framed by gender asymmetry,
culturally embedded and systemic. Thus, the flash point for both discourse
and action was equality or rather the inequality of women. Criminal justice
was merely one system that needed fixing.
Since mandatory practices first evolved as a political strategy, the
discourse among feminists has been marked by reluctance and anxiety
concerning interaction with the state." Such anxiety reflects more than
ambivalence; it reveals the distrust that feminists held for law
enforcement.28 Because police are gatekeepers to the criminal justice
system, they have enforced cultural prescriptions that are essentially
gendered, raced, and classed. 29  Thus, the anxiety associated with
mandatory arrest is emblematic of the paradox inherent in working with
systems that have been the source of the problem.
Feminists appreciated that the police, as agents of the state, should be
held accountable for failing to protect battered women. Yet they were also
cognizant of the misuse of police power in marginalized communities and
how these communities may respond to policies that mandated arrest in
27. See ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 182-84
(2002); see also Suzanne LaFollette, Beware the State, in THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM
ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 537, 537-41 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1973) (describing the life of
Suzanne LaFollette and her emphasis on economic independence over state interference).
28. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 182-84; see also Elizabeth A. Stanko, Missing
the Mark? Policing Battering, in WOMEN, POLICING, AND MALE VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 46, 63-65 (Jalna Hanmer et al. eds., 1989) (noting that feminist criticism of
policing has had positive effects as departments have followed outside suggestions). For a
discussion of the varying views of radical, conservative, and liberal feminism on the
public/private dichotomy and how these views have helped frame the issue of domestic
violence, see KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 37-47
(2003).
29. See John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, Criminal Inequality in America: Patterns
and Consequences, in CRIME & INEQUALITY 14, 22-28 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson
eds., 1995) (examining attitudes and reports that correlate police actions with race, gender,
and class); see also FLA. SUP. CT. RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMM'N., " Where the
Injured Fly for Justice": Reforming Practices Which Impede the Dispensation of Justice to
Minorities in Florida 6-9 (Deborah Hardin Wagner ed., 1991) (finding that adult and
juvenile minorities in Florida receive disparate treatment from law enforcement and
recommending changes to police practices and state statutes). For a series of essays that
view even the nomination of a Supreme Court Justice as an inherently racial and gendered
process, see RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE
THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
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domestic violence cases. Finally, feminists understood that "[p]olice action
cannot by itself stem the tide of violence against women."30 As Elizabeth
Stanko notes, "To do so would require breaking its links with other aspects
of social life that maintain and perpetuate women's subordination. Police
protection within the context of male domination does not and cannot
promise women autonomy.'
1
Notwithstanding deep apprehension, advocates placed mandatory
arrest on the table as a political strategy. In 1994, shortly after the
indictment of O.J. Simpson for the murder of Nicole Brown and Ron
Goldman, a plethora of states passed mandatory arrest. With great fanfare,
politicians embraced the mantra of the BWM, "Zero tolerance," and in
thirty-two jurisdictions across the United States law enforcement discretion
was removed in domestic violence cases. Now, where probable cause was
present, police must arrest. The universe of potential options shrunk to one
and one only, arrest the assailant-no ifs, ands or buts.
Or so we thought.
Il1. The Legal Disconnect: Severing Mandates from Accountability
My daughter understood, at a very early age, that in the absence of
accountability she was free to act as she chose, with no regard for the
consequences. She was painfully aware that accountability was all about
responsibility for actions that she chose to undertake. My child understood
something that I, as architect of New York's mandatory arrest law, failed to
comprehend: Mandates in the absence of accountability is no mandate at
all. In other words, without an accountability paradigm, "shall" could be
construed as maybe, and mandates are merely theoretical and quite frankly
meaningless.
Harsh, you say? Well, I can't explain it any other way. Where
accountability is lacking, so is the force of law-and in this case the
requirement that police arrest in domestic violence cases and in violations
of orders of protection. What we failed to comprehend was how the
confluence of a negative rights constitution with common law notions of
duty would operate to neuter the force and effect of mandatory arrest and
reporting statutes. We did not anticipate the damage that these two views
30. Stanko, supra note 28, at 67.
31. Id.
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would have on enforceability of mandates, regardless of whether suits to
enforce were brought in federal or state court.
Now we know.
A. The Unholy Trilogy ofDeshaney, Castle Rock and Burella
1. Deshaney Re-examined
Starting in 1985 with Deshaney v Winnebago County,32 the United
States Supreme Court relegated the Fourteenth Amendment to the nether
zone, denying to its citizens redress for state refusal to protect against
domestic violence. In spite of evidence that the State of Wisconsin had
knowingly returned five-year-old Joshua DeShaney to his abusive father,
the Rehnquist Court found that the State's actions did not violate the little
boy's substantive due process rights.33 The Court characterized the cause
of the violence as private because Joshua was put into a vegetative state by
the actions of his father.34 The majority disaggregated the State's act of
returning Joshua to an abusive father from the harm and re-characterized
state conduct as inaction.35
Juridical wisdom treated the State as mere observer to Joshua's
beating.36 And as an observer, the Court found that no connection existed
between the State and Joshua's injuries: no connection to the victim's
32. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
33. See id. at 202. Joshua DeShaney was beaten by his father numerous times. Id. at
192-93. After one particularly vicious attack, Joshua was hospitalized. Id. at 192. Because
of the severity of the attack, the State of Wisconsin refused to release the little boy back into
the father's home absent an agreement where Child Protective Services would monitor the
child's condition in the home environment. Id. As part of a contract between the County
and the father, the State would make unannounced visits to check on the little boy. Id. On a
number of occasions, Joshua's father refused to permit the case-worker to see the boy. Id.
at 193. The State did not petition against the father in family court, nor did it remove the
child. Id. at 192-93. Instead, it did nothing to enforce the agreement. Id. Subsequently, the
child was beaten into a vegetative state. Id. at 193. Joshua's biological mother filed suit
against the State of Wisconsin alleging that their actions violated the child's Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id.
34. Id. at 201-03.
35. Id. at200-01.
36. See id. at 201 (stating that "[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers
that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything
to render him any more vulnerable to them").
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injuries meant there was no tie or connection to the victim. 3' Absent a
connection to the plaintiff, the State could not have violated Joshua's rights.
Essentially, Rehnquist views the Fourteenth Amendment as
"negative," meaning its purpose is to prevent state conduct that interferes
with individual rights. The catch is that the Court views "conduct" as either
passive or affirmative, and affirmative conduct is narrowly construed. For
example, in Deshaney, the Court characterizes the cause of Joshua's
injuries as "private," since the beating was administered by Joshua's
father.38 The state is off the hook because the direct cause, fist to child's
head, repeatedly, was the father's conduct. Interpreted in this manner the
state's conduct is recast as inaction. Where there is inaction or an omission
to act, the plaintiff must prove that a duty via a special relationship existed
between the victim and the state.39 This is a true Catch-22 because once
you characterize action as inaction it is almost impossible to create the
necessary link between the injured party and the state.
But Rehnquist's analysis is fatally flawed. The State did act. It placed
little Joshua in the zone of danger. Remember, the Winnebago Department
of Social Services had placed a hospital hold on the boy after he had been
beaten by his father.4° Joshua was returned to his father only after his father
agreed to allow Social Services into the home unannounced and at any time
that the State chose to examine the child. We know that Deshaney refused
admittance to his home on numerous occasions. We also know that the
State did not file a petition, revoke the agreement, remove the child or place
the child under the jurisdiction of family court.4 ' Here the State chose to
return and leave Joshua in the home of a known abuser. As a result of this
choice, Joshua was reduced to a vegetable.
Rehnquist's conception of affirmative conduct is rather interesting. He
views the State's conduct as not only inaction but legally irrelevant to the
harm. But think for a moment about negative/positive action or
affirmative/passive conduct. If I am driving my car and I strike a bicyclist,
one could say that I failed to apply the brakes. Yet, it would be just as
correct to characterize my conduct as continuing to drive. Indeed, I would
37. See id. (holding that the "State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua").
38. See id. at 195 (stating that "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause
itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors").
39. See id. at 197 ("Such a duty may arise out of certain 'special relationships' created
or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals.").
40. Id. at 192-93.
41. Id.
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argue that most acts have both "active" and "passive" components; how
conduct is characterized lies in the eye of the beholder, not in fact.
Unfortunately for Joshua, the Court's characterization of state conduct,
while defying logic, denied him the protection he needed and deserved.
Here, it was as if Winnebago County had placed Joshua in front of an
oncoming train. While the State was not the sole cause or the immediate
cause of the harm, it certainly contributed to it. Thus, the State's conduct
combined with the father's to cause the harm, a fact that the Court refused
to countenance.
The DeShaney decision effectively slammed shut the door to claims of
substantive due process violations by the State except when the
victim/survivor is in the State's physical custody. This crabbed notion of
state action is the death knell for Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims, not only when battered women assert state failure to
protect, but in cases where any person interposes such an argument.
The scholarship that followed Deshaney attempted to reconstruct the
legal terrain so that state accountability was not ferreted out of the
Fourteenth Amendment.42 Advocates and scholars alike crafted a theory
that they thought would "link" battered women to the state, in other words
create the connection that would make accountability possible. The
centerpiece of the "theory" was statutory mandates coupled with court
issued orders of protection in domestic violence cases. The reasoning was
quite simple. Even though the Court had a crabbed vision of state conduct,
scholars believed that a statutory mandate to arrest would provide the
necessary predicate to trigger Fourteenth Amendment protection.
Moreover, statutory mandates to arrest coupled with court mandated
protective orders that incorporated "must arrest provisions," would certainly
do the trick. Surely, the Deshaney Court did not craft a decision that would
42. See Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel
in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 557, 569-81 (2006)
[hereinafter Balos, Domestic Violence Matters] (arguing that civil protection order cases
trigger a right to counsel because the state has undertaken sufficient action to meet the
requirement of state action implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Caitlin E.
Borgman, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection
Deflect Deshaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280, 1307 (1990) (arguing that orders of protection
create the necessary link between battered woman and the state); Susanne M. Browne, Due
Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the Inadequate Response of the Police in
Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1295, 1312-13 (1995) (stating that orders
of protection constitute state action); Lauren L. Mc Farlane, Domestic Violence Victims v.
Municipalities: Who Pays When the Police Will Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
929, 958-60 (1991) (asserting that where orders of protection exist, state action exists).
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sanction state conduct that consciously ignored legislative mandates, such
as mandatory arrest?
We could not have been more wrong.
While we were terribly wrong, it is important to contextualize the
decision to link mandates with accountability. In 1985, when Deshaney
was decided, mandatory arrest was not on the horizon, much less a part of
public policy. In fact, in Deshaney, there were no statutory directives that
mandated a specific response by the state; discretion was still the better part
of valor when it came to child protection. Unlike Deshaney, mandatory
arrest severely limits the universe of options open to law enforcement by
reducing it to one and only one option-arrest. Where probable cause is
present-that either an order of protection has been violated or that a new
offense has been committed by an intimate-the only "choice" is to arrest
the perpetrator.43 Elimination of police discretion was instituted because
police refused to exercise that discretion. Indeed, both federal and state
legislative bodies considered police arrest avoidance as not only real, but a
critical factor in the continued abuse of women.
44
Castle Rock and Burella not only alter our thinking but remind us that
Deshaney's wall around the Fourteenth Amendment is impenetrable.
2. Castle Rock and Burella: The Nails in the Coffin
In Castle Rock, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the
Colorado Legislature failed to create a Fourteenth Amendment property
interest in the enforcement of an order of protection.45 Scalia asserts, "We
do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly [make]
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory," because "[a] well established
tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory
arrest statutes.,46 In thirty-two words, Justice Scalia invalidated not only
the findings of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, but the
legislative history of thirty-two states as well. This is quite an amazing
feat, even for the current configuration of this Court.
43. Colorado provides for either arrest, or where arrest is impractical, to secure an
arrest warrant. See infra Part III.A.2.
44. See Miccio, A House Divided, supra note 11, at 273; see, e.g., VAWA SENATE
REPORT 1993, supra note 6, at 38 (encouraging police arrest of abusers by law); infra note
48 and accompanying text.
45. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-62 (2005) (distinguishing
examples of statutory language that have created rights in Colorado from the current case).
46. Id.at759-61.
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With the stroke of a pen, the Court wiped out the history of police
arrest avoidance that characterized law enforcement conduct for over forty
years. Rather than credit the findings of the Senate and thirty-two states,
the Court chose to acknowledge the historic position of discretion in police
practices. As Roger Pilon points out in a provocative examination of Castle
Rock, tradition has trumped not only the text of the statute but the
legislative history of two-thirds of the states. 47 And while Pilon raises an
important issue about tradition, he mischaracterizes tradition as police
discretion. What drives Scalia's decision to trump thirty-two jurisdictions'
legislative history is not police discretion but adherence to the tradition of
treating the Fourteenth Amendment as a negative rights provision. If there
is any doubt that Scalia is invoking the specter of Deshaney and
Rehnquist's negative rights paradigm, one need only examine the rationale
put forth by the majority.
The Court concluded that (1) the Colorado Legislature really didn't
mean "must" when it used the word "shall" more than five times in the
arrest statutes; (2) the Legislature employed a process that was really
discretionary, thereby placing its imprimatur on police power to decide;
(3) Jessica Gonzales and her children were "indirect" beneficiaries of the
state's mandatory arrest statute; and finally, (4) enforcement of a protective
order doesn't fit what the Court considers a "property interest."
Such subterfuge does little to hide the real reasons for their decision,
which will be discussed in section 4 of this Part. First, it truly strains the
imagination to characterize "shall" as "maybe" or "maybe not." Frankly, if
we follow the Court's logic, the tablets from Mt. Sinai are merely the Ten
Suggestions as opposed to the Ten Commandments. Please, do not let my
child know that honor thy father and mother is merely suggested behavior.
Even if we take the Court's view at face value, their reliance on a 1980
ABA Report to support their "finding" reveals the moral, if not legal,
paucity of their position. The Report cited by the Court was written in 1980
when mandatory arrest wasn't an idea, much less a concept. Indeed, it was
not until 1978, that the UNITED STATES Government first considered
male intimate violence a problem. In the report produced by the United
States Civil Rights Commission, the Commission characterized police
arrest avoidance as a major obstacle to abatement of male intimate violence.
48 Then again in 1984, 1985, 1993 the UNITED STATES Attorney's
47. See Roger Pilon, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez: Executive Indifference,
Judicial Complicity, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. L. REV. 101, 104 (2005) (providing an overview of
the Supreme Court's response to the Castle Rock case).
48. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PU3LIC POLICY 20-
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General's Office, the State Court Reports on Women and the Courts, and
the UNITED STATES Judiciary Committee, respectively, produced reports
which established both police arrest avoidance and the need to remove
discretion from police.49
When you combine the evidence of systemic police arrest avoidance
proffered by the Federal Government with the State Courts Reports and the
legislative history of thirty-two states, nationwide, one has to wonder why
Justice Scalia preferred instead to rely on an outdated and repudiated report
published by the ABA in 1980. While this is illustrative of the majority's
ignorance of the issue-male intimate violence-acting on such ignorance
is truly indefensible when the Court had in its control hundreds of amicus
briefs that spelled out the findings of the various studies, reports and white
papers conducted over the past thirty years.50
22 (1978) ("Perhaps the most serious problem for the individual who has suffered from
assault is the failure of the police to respond to [a] call for help.").
49. Id.; see VAWA Senate Report 1993, supra note 6, at 45-46 (1993) (describing a
particular case in which an investigating officer insisted that a victim who was stabbed with
a screwdriver, raped, and sodomized by her attacker must have provoked the attack); see
also William L. Hart, Statement of the Chairman, in ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT vi, vi-vii (1984) (reporting that a "victim of family
violence is no less a victim than one set upon by strangers, and police are obviating their
responsibility by refusing to arrest"); see, e.g., COLO. GENDER & JUST. COMM., COLORADO
GENDER AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2000), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/gendejusticedocs/2000report.pdf (noting the
"tendency to blame victims continues and police fail to arrest"); COMM'N ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE JuD. SyS., GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
GEORGIA (1991), available at http://www2.state.ga.us/Courts/Supreme/ceadults.htm
(reporting that "[g]ender biased attitudes were demonstrated to be pervasive in the judicial
and law enforcement system's handling of domestic violence cases"). For a comprehensive
list of internet links to individual state-commissioned reports on gender bias in state courts,
see NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, RACE AND GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS: TASK
FORCE, COMMISSION, AND COMMITTEE REPORTS, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
WC/Publications/KISRacEthStLnks.pdf.
50. See Brief for the Nat'l. Ass'n of Women Lawyers & the Nat'l. Crime Victims Bar
Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8-10, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328201 (discussing the consequences of
domestic violence and failure of police to enforce mandatory arrest statutes); Brief for the
Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17-22, Castle
Rock, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328202 (explaining how the police further
endanger victims of domestic violence when they fail to enforce protection orders); Brief for
the Nat'l. Black Police Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27-30, Castle
Rock, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328203 (discussing police protocol with respect
to domestic violence); Brief for the Nat'l. Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Arnici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19-30, Castle Rock, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL
353608 (discussing pervasiveness of domestic violence and the likely increase in such
violence that results from failure to enforce protection orders); Brief for AARP as Amicus
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Second, the argument that Jessica Gonzales and her three little girls
were indirect beneficiaries of the Colorado mandatory arrest bill is just
ridiculous.5' Colorado and thirty-one of her sister states passed mandatory
arrest because of, not in spite of, battered women and their children. Jessica
and her three little girls, Katherine, Leslie, and Rebecca, were exactly the
folks contemplated by Colorado, New York, California, Texas,
Connecticut, etc., etc. To portray them as "incidental" is absolute folly.
Jessica was a battered woman holding an order of protection issued by a
court in the State of Colorado. Her children were derivative "holders" of
the order. Thus, all three were entitled to enforcement of the order
consistent with § 18-6-803.5(3)(b)(I). 52 Jessica, Katherine, Leslie and
Rebecca Gonzales were the direct beneficiaries of Colorado's mandatory
arrest law; and the Court's attempt to wish this away clarifies the moral
paucity of its holding.
Finally, Justice Scalia writes that Colorado's mandatory arrest law
doesn't confer a property interest because, "seeking ... an arrest warrant
would be an entitlement to nothing but procedure.0 3 And where there is a
procedure there is discretion, thus the statute does not form the "basis for a
property interest. 54 But Scalia is wrong.
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4-10, Castle Rock, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL
353692 (discussing domestic violence in the specific context of elder abuse); Brief for The
Family Violence Prevention Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4-10,
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353693 (discussing domestic violence
and its consequences for children); Brief of Peggy Kerns, Former Member of the House of
Representatives of the State of Colorado, and Tex. Domestic Violence Direct Service
Providers, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12-14, 19-21, Castle Rock, 545
U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353694 (discussing the societal impact of domestic
violence and the danger of allowing police too much discretion in enforcing protection
orders); Brief of Natl. Coal. Against Domestic Violence & Nat'l. Ctr. for Victims of Crime
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12-17, Castle Rock, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278),
2005 WL 353985 (explaining police procedure and the increased danger to domestic
violence victims that results from failure to enforce protection orders); Brief of Int'l Law
Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 27-28, Castle Rock, 545 U.S.
748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328200 (discussing the impact of police failure to enforce
protection orders on U.S. treaty obligations).
51. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766-67 (holding that "the alleged property interest here
arises incidentally, not out of some new species of government benefit or service, but out of
a function that government actors have always performed-to wit, arresting people who they
have probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense").
52. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b)(I) (2004).
53. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 764.
54. Id.
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I cannot believe that Justice Scalia lacks an understanding of the
process to secure either an arrest or arrest warrant. There is nothing
discretionary about either process; to be sure, these processes are anything
but discretionary. Where there is probable cause that the respondent
violated an order of protection, the police must arrest or seek a warrant.55 If
the police file for a warrant, and the filing is supported by probable cause,
the court, in this instance, has no discretion whatsoever-it must issue the
warrant.56 Consequently, the universe is reduced to one option and one
option only: arrest or get a warrant; Judicial and law enforcement
discretion has been removed. For Scalia not to understand the function of
arrest and issuance of arrest warrants is beyond comprehension.
In effect, the majority gutted Colorado's mandatory arrest law. If
there was concern about the effect of the law or the issuance of orders of
protection that carry with it arrest power, then the appropriate route would
have been to amend the statute by either legislative act or by referendum.57
The Court invaded the province of the Legislature effectively marginalizing
the voice of the people. This is judicial activism at its worst; at best, it is
ironic that the architect of this decision is a self-heralded states rights, strict
constructionist, anti-"judicial activist" jurist.
The Court ran rough shod over a fundamental precept of American
political theory; Jessica Gonzales had the right to governmental protection
because as a member of the body politic she had delegated that enforcement




57. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed .... ."); see also John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent
& End of Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU
20-21 (Sir Ernest Barker ed., Read Books, 2008) (1690) ("The liberty of man in society is
to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth,
nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall
enact according to the trust put in it.").
58. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762).
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3. Burella: A Reaffirmation of Castle Rock
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled
that Jill Burella did not have a procedural or substantive due process right
to have officers enforce an order of protection, nor did she have a viable
equal protection claim.59 Although this ruling is confined to courts within
the Third Circuit, it is a ruling from Hell. In one opinion, the Fourteenth
Amendment in its entirety has been foreclosed to battered women and their
children; Legislative enactment be damned.
I will not reiterate the facts. But the reader should know that the
perpetrator in this case was a police officer, the survivor his wife, there was
a pattern of abuse that the Philadelphia Police Department witnessed and/or
had knowledge of,60 and the perpetrator violated conduct requirements
levied by the Police Department.6 ' It is also important to note that the
statute in this case was even clearer than Colorado's, or using Scalia's
lexicon, "more mandatory., 62  In Pennsylvania, the Legislature did not
insert the word "reasonable," but rather made it quite clear that, "[a] police
officer or sheriff shall arrest" a defendant for violating an order issued
under Chapter 23 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.63 Moreover, the
Pennsylvania Legislature amended the Pennsylvania Protection and Abuse
Act, enacted in 1990 to clearly establish "must arrest." 64 In fact, the 1994
amendment removed the words "may arrest," and substituted shall arrest,
59. See Burella v. Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 149-50 (concluding that even if her
contentions are true, Jill Burella's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of
the law were not violated, despite the "terrible deficiency" of the Philadelphia Police
Department revealed by her allegations).
60. See id. at 138 (stating that officer Reamer served the protective order on the
perpetrator and not only witnessed officer Burella's violation of that order but permitted him
into the marital home, and that Reamer did not arrest Burella as required by statute).
61. See id. at 137-38 (summarizing George Burella's repeated threats to kill his wife,
violence toward his wife and others; Jill Burella's efforts to obtain police protection and
legal protection orders, and police failure to comply with those orders to charge her husband
for his abuse).
62. See id. at 151 (noting that in Castle Rock, the Court "held that the Colorado
legislature failed to create a 'truly... mandatory' arrest statute because 'shall' had been
used elsewhere in Colorado arrest laws to mean 'may,' and because the statute explicitly
gave police officers the option of arresting or seeking an arrest warrant" (quoting Castle
Rock, 545 U.S. at 761)). While I am paraphrasing Justice Scalia, I am in no way endorsing,
agreeing with, or condoning his interpretation of the word "shall."
63. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113 (A) (2003) (emphasis added).
64. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113 (1990) (stating that "[a]n arrest for violation
of an order issues pursuant to this chapter may be made without warrant upon probable
cause whether or not the violation is committed in the presence of the police").
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making it crystal clear that once the order is violated the police have no
other option but to arrest.
Not so.
Using Castle Rock to conclude that Burella, not unlike Jessica
Gonzales, did not have a property interest in the enforcement of the order of
protection, the Third Circuit Court relied on the "deep-rooted nature of law
enforcement discretion, even in the presence of seemingly mandatory
legislative commands. 65  Justice Fuentes uncritically adopted all of the
arguments from the Castle Rock majority and reaffirmed the Supreme
Court's observation that Colorado, and by implication her sister states, did
not vest in the petitioner a right to request much less demand an arrest.66 It
is clear that the Third Circuit as well as the United States Supreme Court
have little if any knowledge about male intimate violence. Mandatory
arrest was considered strategic by the BWM, because it shifted the focus
from individual battered women to the State. Rather than place a battered
woman in the position of demanding or requesting arrest, mandatory arrest
made that "decision" the province of the state. This was an important
consideration because advocates believed that if the assailant viewed the
State as the culprit, retaliation against women and children might be abated.
Moreover, any demand or request for arrest by battered women was
obviated by this statutory scheme: Burella and Gonzales' protective orders
made any request/demand redundant and unnecessary because arrest was
statutorily mandated. The Third Circuit elevated Castle Rock by animating
an erroneous observation with the force of law.67
4. What Were They Thinking?
Judge Ambro's concurrence in Burella correctly lays out the terrain
after Castle Rock. He concludes that "my colleagues are correct to suggest
that a legislature would be hard pressed to draft around Castle Rock in light
of the well 'established tradition of police discretion [that] has long co-
existed with apparently mandatory arrest statutes. 6 8 While I concur with
65. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 761 (providing precedential support that even
mandatory statutory language fails to deprive officers of all discretion to make arrests).
66. See Burella, 501 F.3d. at 145-46 (stating that petitioner fails to address the
Supreme Court's observation in Castle Rock that even a statute mandating an arrest does not
imply that a particular domestic violence victim is entitled to an arrest).
67. See id. at 145 (utilizing Castle Rock to obviate requests or demands for arrest).
68. Id. at 153 (Ambro, T., concurring in part) (quoting Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760).
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his conclusion, Justice Ambro made the same mistake as the majority in
Castle Rock. Castle Rock was the first case to raise the issue of statutory
mandates and police discretion, thus it is incorrect to claim a well
established tradition. Remember, Deshaney was not about mandates; in
fact, there were no mandates which defined or coerced behavior on the part
of Child Protective Services.69
So what's up here? Why are the courts conjuring up "well established
traditions" when none exist, torturing the common usage of the word
"shall," and disregarding the legislative history of thirty-two states, the
United States Senate and Federal Governmental Agencies?
Castle Rock and its progeny are the convergence of three important
theories: the negative rights doctrine as applied to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the rarified doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the
application of the Public Duty Doctrine (PDD) in state tort cases.
a. The Negative Rights Doctrine
In DeShaney, Justice Rehnquist opined that "nothing in the language
of the Due Process Clause requires the State to protect the life, liberty and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. [It] is a limitation
on the State's power to act."70 Consequently, Justice Rehnquist starts from
the position that the Constitution is a negative rights document. If the
Constitution is a negative rights document, and specifically the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no duty on the part of the state to protect citizens from
what is perceived as "private conduct." Essentially, the modem approach to
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection is "keep your laws off my
body."7' This is why we get the decision in Harris v. McRae,72 where the
Court held, inter alia, that since the state did not create poverty it has no
69. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
70. Id. at 195.
71. "Keep Your Laws Off My Body" is a time-honored bumper sticker which first
appeared in the 1970s.
72. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (holding that laws that make it
more difficult for an indigent woman to get an abortion do not violate the constitution
because poverty is not a suspect class). In Harris v. McRae the question before the court
was whether Title XIX of the Social Security Act required states to pay for medically
necessary abortions that would otherwise be unreimbursed under the Hyde Amendment, an
Annual Appropriations bill, given that the restriction of federal funding would place a
greater burden on an indigent woman's ability to procure an abortion. Id. at 301.
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duty to provide poor women with abortions.73 Thus, the State can restrict
access to abortions by cutting off the flow of funds to poor women who
wish to exercise their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.74  And
because the "negative" aspect of the theory of negative rights adopts a
restrictive view of state action, legal guarantees move beyond women's
reach.75
Chief Justice Rehnquist's adoption of the negative-rights standard is
rooted in principles of federalism that foster clear and unequivocal lines of
demarcation between state and federal power. As Laurence Tribe notes,
Rehnquist wants to maintain separate spheres, of state and federal authority,
recognizing only a "coterminous" intersection between state and federal
power when the state violates clearly defined negative restraints.76 For
Rehnquist, a negative rights approach safeguards the delicate balance that
federalism constructs, and perhaps more importantly, preserves.77
Yet Rehnquist's narrow interpretation of the due process clause is
antithetical to its origins. The Reconstruction Amendments, and
specifically the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, were
enacted to provide citizens' protection regardless of whether the harm was
created by the state or by private actors.78 As Michael Gerhardt notes,
73. See id. at 328 (White, J. concurring) ("As the Court points out, Roe v. Wade did
not purport to adjudicate a right to have an abortion funded by the federal government, but
only to be free from unreasonable official interference with private choice.").
74. See id.; see also Laurence Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable
Rights, Affirmative Duties and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 330-32,
334 (1985) (discussing how the abortion funding cases raise questions about negative versus
positive rights).
75. See MAcKINNON, supra note 14, at 164-65. MacKinnon writes:
If one group is socially granted the positive freedom to do whatever it wants to
the other group, to determine what the second group will be and do this rather
than that, no amount of negative freedom legally guaranteed to the second group
will make it equal to the first. For women this has meant that civil society, the
domain in which women are distinctly subordinated and deprived of power, has
been beyond the reach of legal guarantees.
Id.
76. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITuTIONAL LAW 551-53 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining the separate spheres of state and federal authority and the points where they
intersect); see also U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550-51 (1875) ("The people of the
United States resident within any State are subject to two governments: one State and the
other National .... It is the natural consequence of a citizenship which owes allegiance to
two sovereignties, and claims protection from both.").
77. Id.
78. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13 (3d
ed. 2006) (explaining that the Reconstruction Amendments were written to protect
individual citizens from state and non-state actors).
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"[t]he dual purposes of the fourteenth amendment permeating through all of
its provisions were (1) to provide constitutional protection for the
fundamental or 'God-given' or 'natural' rights of all United States citizens
by (2) radically altering the design of federalism ... to invest the federal
government with complete authority to punish the infringement of such
rights by either state or private action. '79 By 1873, with the Slaughterhouse
case the erosion of Fourteenth Amendment protection begins. In 1985
with Deshaney, its promise is weakened. By 2007, the Fourteenth
Amendment is invisible.
2. Sovereign Immunity, the Public Duty Doctrine (PDD) and Conceptions
of State Accountability
Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine rooted in the British
common-law system where the Crown was immunized from suit.8'
Sovereign immunity bars all claims against the state because, "there can be
no legal right as against the authority that made the law on which the right
depends. 82  The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields state actors,
including police, from liability even when state conduct constitutes
negligence.83 It can be used to shield state actors in federal constitutional or
state tort claims. The PDD is a tort doctrine created by statute that limits
immunity while at the same time creates a narrow conduit through which
suits against the state must pass. The PDD operates as a qualified immunity
doctrine because, unlike sovereign immunity, it permits some claims
against the state to go forward.
79. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409, 427 (1990) (emphasis
added).
80. Clearly Slaughterhouse, which eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
and DeShaney, which neutered substantive due process protection, are in play. But both turn
the logic and history of the amendment on its head. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2765 (1866) (statement of Senator Howard).
81. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("A sovereign is exempt
from suit ... on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
82. Id. at 353.
83. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (holding that
the public should accept the loss resulting from the negligence of government employees
because the public, and derivatively individuals, benefit from government and the services
they provide).
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The PDD first appeared in the United States in South v. Maryland,84 a
case involving police failure to protect an individual from a marauding
mob. 85 The Court in South held that the police are not liable for injuries to
an individual member of the community, even where the police
unreasonably neglected to assert their authority.86 The PDD has been
widely adopted by the states to shield the actions of its political
subdivisions from suit and from public scrutiny.87 The principle underlying
this doctrine is quite clear; the police owe a duty to the public, not to
individual citizens.88 More importantly, however, police are treated no
differently than the common man/woman. Just as there is no duty to
rescue, to protect or to prevent crime on the part of Jane Doe, there is no
duty to rescue, protect or prevent crime on the part of the police absent a
special relationship.89 Consequently, no particularized duty of care is
allocated to individuals in the absence of a "special relationship. '" 90 And, as
84. 59 U.S. 396, 403 (1855) (holding that a sheriff's refusal to assist a citizen who was
in danger did not breach or restrain any of the citizen's rights under the constitution).
85. See id. at 401 (stating the facts of the case that an individual citizen asked for
assistance from a sheriff but the sheriff refused assistance).
86. See id. at 403 (stating that no breach or restraint of rights occurs where law
enforcement maliciously refuse to act).
87. See, e.g., Amy Felman, Comment, The Special Duty Doctrine: A Just
Compromise, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 409, 418-19 (1987) (discussing the adoption of the PDD
by various state courts); Cynthia Zellner MacKinnon, Note, Negligence of Municipal
Employees: Re-Defining the Scope of Police Liability, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 720, 724-29
(1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees] (discussing cases
accepting or rejecting the PDD).
88. See MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees, supra note 87, at 725
("Because police have a general duty of public protection, no liability follows a breach of
that duty to an individual.") (citation omitted); see also Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599-
600 (Ariz. 1982) (removing the "public/private duty doctrine," but noting that certain areas
of immunity for state actors remained protected) overruled by Johnson v. Superior Court In
& For County of Pima, 763 P.2d 1382 (Ariz. App. Div. 1988); Shore v. Town of Stonington,
444 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Conn. 1982) (discussing the distinction between public and
private duties); Riss v. City of N.Y., 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968) ("[T]here is no
warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the powers of government for the
courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of tort liability for police protection
to [individual] members of the public.").
89. South, 59 U.S. at 401, 402-03 (1855); see also supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
90. See THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. HAVERY HAGGARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 2 § 300, at 385-89 (4th
ed. 1932) [hereinafter COOLEY ON TORTS], (articulating the underlying principles of the
PDD); see also South, 59 U.S. at 403. The Court stated:
The declaration in the case before us... alleges no special individual right,
privilege, or franchise in the plaintiff, from the enjoyment of which he has been
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the cases strongly suggest, the current trend is to find no special
relationship, even when police fail to follow procedures that are specifically
enumerated by statute or departmental mandates.9'
Judicial policy considerations which justify the PDD are imported
from conceptions of sovereign immunity. First, suits against the state or its
sub-divisions (municipalities) would deplete the public coffers and result in
diminished public services,92 and second, by substituting the judgment of
the court for that of the public official, the court would be in terrain where it
lacked expertise. 93 Moreover such "second-guessing" would result in the
usurpation of legislative prerogative. 94
Let's take each justification one at a time. The depletion of public
coffers argument is quite simple: if liability claims against the state are
allowed and successful, potential judgments could severely reduce public
restrained or hindered by the malicious act of the sheriff.... Consequently, we
are of opinion that the declaration sets forth no sufficient cause of action.
Id.; Riss 240 N.E.2d at 860-61 (N.Y.) (finding that the city could not be held liable in tort
for police failure to protect an individual member of the public in the absence of an
undertaking of responsibilities to that particular individual); Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137,
139, 140 n.3 (Cal. 1983) (asserting that the general rule is "[a] person does not, by becoming
a police officer, insulate himself from any of the basic duties which everyone owes to other
people, but neither does he assume any greater obligation to others individually. The only
additional duty undertaken by accepting employment as a police officer is the duty owed to
the public at large."); see, e.g., Ryan, 656 P.2d at 599 (characterizing the distinction between
discretionary and ministerial acts as "semantic legerdemain");
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Gemeth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he
imposition of... liability.., would impose an undue burden upon municipal corporations,
and might in fact substantially interfere with the licensing and investigatory functions of
such ... corporations."); see also Casey v. Geiger, 499 A.2d 606, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
("[Ilt is questionable how long any municipality could maintain its parks, playgrounds and
swimming pools. Due to the cost of increased insurance premiums and added police
protection, municipalities will lack the necessary funds to provide recreational services. The
end result is that the welfare of the public will suffer.").
93. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees, supra note 87, at 726
("Local government decisions which affect large groups of people involve a delicate
balancing of conflicting interests. Respecting this balance, some courts prohibit tort suits
against municipal officers to avoid inappropriately substituting judicial judgment for that of
the legislature.").
94. See, e.g., id. at 727 (noting that those who support the PDD often assert that
abandonment of the doctrine would lead to judicial usurpation of legislative power); see also
Porter v. City of Urbana, 410 N.E.2d. 610, 612 (11. App. Ct. 1980) ("[A] public rather than
private duty provides little if any consolation to the aggrieved individual. Yet violations of
the public duty may be punished in criminal proceedings. The rule is sometimes justified on
the somewhat murky distinction between proprietary and governmental functions; police
work falls within the latter category." (citing Keane v. City of Chicago, 240 N.E.2d 321
(1968))).
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monies earmarked for services.95 Such a reduction would result in either
cutbacks or elimination of much needed public services.96 Indeed, Amici
for the Town of Castle Rock sounded this alarm in their briefs in opposition
to Ms. Gonzales's claim of a property interest in her order of protection.97
Apparently, as one author noted, the "floodgates" would open and the states
would be bankrupted. 9
But this "chicken little the sky is falling" argument is hyperbole. As
Justice Keating noted in Riss: "no municipality has gone bankrupt because
it has had to respond in damages when a policeman causes injury through
carelessly driving or in the thousands of situations where... the
State... has been held liable for the tortuous conduct of their employees." 99
Moreover, the City of Los Angeles did not go bankrupt due to the
Rampart's scandal which resulted in hundreds of judgments against the
LAPD for manufacturing evidence against defendants in drug sweep cases.
What we do know and what is not subject to unfettered conjecture is
the cost of male intimate violence to the family, to the community and to
the State. Male intimate violence is the leading cause of injury to women
between the ages of fifteen and forty-four, and studies conducted after the
1992 public hearings held by the Judiciary Committee, confirm that male
intimate violence is very costly in terms of hospitalization, lost wages, court
costs, and incarceration. 1° Justice Souter noted that Congress estimates the
cost of domestic violence at three billion dollars a year.'0 ' And as Joan
Zorza points out, male intimate violence is the primary factor in women's
and children's homelessness.
0 2
95. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.04.25, at
199 (West 3d ed. 2003) (1904) (discussing the negative effects of imposing liability on
municipalities); see generally MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees, supra note
87, at 727-29; COOLEY ON TORTS, supra note 90, § 300.
96. Casey, 499 A.2d at 614.
97. Brief of the Natl. League of Cities and Municipalities as Amicus Curiae on behalf
of Petitioner, Town of Castle Rock, at 24, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278)
(on file with author).
98. Riss v. City of New York22 N.Y. 2d 579
99. Id. at 585 (Keating, J., dissenting).
100. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 59-61, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf
(reporting that violence against women is predominantly intimate partner violence and
indicating the social costs of such violence).
101. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 383, 384 (1994) (citing The Violence Against Women Act: Hearing
on S. 2754 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 37 (1990)).
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The cost of male intimate violence is documented: the cost to the
State as a result of lawsuits for state torts or Constitutional torts is purely
speculative and a not-so-sophisticated "what if game." In spite of the facts,
courts and legislatures rely on the latter claim in refusing to reform or
reinterpret either the Fourteenth Amendment, sovereign immunity or the
PDD doctrine. As a result, battered women and their children are barred
from filing suit. This not only harms battered women but the community as
a whole.
For the battered woman, there is the illusion of protection, which is
worse than no protection at all. Not unlike Jessica Gonzales and Jill Burella,
millions of battered women nation-wide rely on the promises made by the
State vis-a-viz mandatory arrest and other statutory mandates which
prescribe a particularized set of behaviors from police and other state
actors. And yet, when police or other state actors refuse to follow mandates,
there is no remedy for battered women and their children. As a result of
crabbed notions concerning state accountability, responsibility and duty,
state actors can continue to ignore mandates by choosing to do nothing.
This outcome creates an untenable situation because it dupes the public into
thinking that "we" are taking steps to abate male intimate violence while the
opposite is in fact occurring.
New York conducted a state-wide study about the effectiveness of
mandatory arrest and the criminal justice system. Six years after the
passage of its mandatory arrest law, the New York State Office for the
Prevention of Domestic Violence (OPDV) found that a significant number
of cases continued to fall out of the system with virtually no consequences
to the offender and little safety to the victims. 103 The Interim Report
reported that the range for bail in four of eight research sites was $200-500
resulting in only 9-14% of suspects remaining in jail.' 4 In six of the eight
sites studied, very few convictions resulted in more than fines, although
probation and jail-terms were options.10 5 And in the two remaining sites,
offenders received almost no punishment because over half of the sentences
imposed were conditional discharges. 10 6 Yet, as noted by the evaluators in
103. STATE OF NEW YORK, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, OFFICE FOR THE
PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE FAMILY PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
INTERVENTION ACT OF 1994: EVALUATION OF THE MANDATORY ARREST PROVISIONS, THIRD
INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 51 (2000) [hereinafter INTERIM
REPORT].
104. Id. at 46.
105. Id. at 48.
106. Id. at 46.
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New York, fines have not been shown to reduce recidivism. 10 7 Conditional
discharge is problematic because it provides neither supervision nor control
over the offender.108 At the very least, the data from New York challenges
the notion that punish and protect are consistently part of a criminal justice
repertoire.
As for arrest, OPDV reported low arrest rates in cases where suspects
fled the scene. The evaluators found that in all eight sites studied, none of
the police departments were "structured to routinely pursue suspects who
fled."'1 9 Yet two of the research sites were New York City precincts, which
have follow-up procedures for investigation and apprehension of suspects
who have left the scene in stranger cases. l10 At the very least, follow-up
should have taken place in these two jurisdictions.
It appears that the obstacle to police follow-up in suspect-absent cases
is one of police attitude, not limited resources or structural impediments.
For example, the Interim Report recommended that the legislature "make
clear that mandatory arrest extends to suspect-absent cases.""' This
recommendation implies that police arrest avoidance is due to the absence
of explicit language mandating arrest in suspect-absent cases.
Yet, suspect presence at the scene is not the trigger for mandatory
arrest, nor is it required by the state's general arrest statutes." 12 To trigger
mandatory arrest in domestic violence cases, one must find probable cause
that a felony or violation of a stay away order has been committed by a
member of the same household, and household is broadly construed.
Consistent with the state's general arrest statute, there is no requirement for
a site arrest, nor is there a bar to subsequent off-site arrests. Indeed, arrests
are made routinely in suspect-absent stranger cases.'
3
107. Id.




112. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(l)(b) (McKinney 2004) (authorizing a police
officer to arrest a suspect "when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has
committed such crime, whether in his presence or otherwise"). And reasonable cause is
defined as probable cause. Id.
113. As a former New York City prosecutor, I was aware of numerous arrests made by
police after the suspect fled the scene. If an arrest was not made within a short time
following the initial investigation, it would be referred to the Detective Bureau where it
would be assigned for further investigation and possible arrest. In fact in New York City,
the NYPD has a form-the DD-5, which is a Detective Follow-Up Form; so much for no
subsequent procedures after the initial investigation. In one suspect-absent case that I
handled-which was a domestic violence case-I dispatched the District Attorney Detective
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There appears to be a new twist to police arrest avoidance, the practice
police departments engaged in during the 1970s and 1980s prior to the
institution of mandatory arrest. During that period, police routinely refused
to arrest offenders even when police witnessed the violence because they
believed such acts were private." 4 Such conduct by police was the reason
mandatory arrest was instituted in the jurisdictions-to correct police abuse
of discretion. Now more than thirty years after this issue first came to light
police are engaging in similar tactics by finding an imagined loophole in the
legislation.
Rather than investigate and arrest, police in the eight jurisdictions have
passed this responsibility on to the survivor. If an arrest is to be made, it is
her responsibility to file for and secure either a warrant or summons.115 But
mandatory arrest was instituted as a protective measure, thereby removing
the survivor from the arrest process. The Interim Report's findings suggest
that current police practices have compromised not only survivor autonomy
but her safety.
In California, refusal to arrest is equally pervasive and pernicious.'
1 6
In Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 117 the California Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, leaving in place the trial court's dismissal of a case
involving a battered woman murdered by her husband in the courthouse
waiting room. 18 While the outcome is disturbing, it is the reason for the
outcome that is disquieting.
Squad to arrest an alleged batterer in a Lords and Taylor department store. This arrest was
made under the NYPD mandatory-arrest procedures in domestic violence cases-procedures
that were part of the Bruno v. Codd settlement agreement. The NYPD procedures
subsequently became the foundation for the statewide mandatory-arrest law.
114. See Bruno, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 976 (alleging police failed to act on domestic abuse
"even [when] the physical evidence of the assault [was] unmistakable and undenied"); see
also Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984) (alleging a
lower form of protection is afforded to victims of domestic abuse).
115. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 103, at 2.
116. In 2005, California Attorney General Lockyer released a report that found that
police arrest avoidance is epidemic in the state. Press Release, State of Cal., Office of the
Attorney Gen., Attorney General Lockyer Report on Domestic Violence Finds Criminal
Justice System Is Failing to Protect Victims, Families: AG's Task Force Makes 44
Recommendations to Reduce Domestic Violence (July 26, 2005), http://caag.state.ca.us./
newsalerts/2005/05-060.htm (on file with author). While I applaud Attorney General
Lockyer for his diligence and for the recommendations, I am struck by the fact that not one
of the recommendations called for an overhaul of the PDD or California's Tort Claims Act.
Once again, accountability falls off the radar screen.
117. 45 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2002).
118. Id. at 1175-80.
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The court reinforced the no-duty rule, as that rule applies to state
actors and the prevention of crime."l 9 Citing Williams v. State,120 the court
held that protection from crime was not required because the nature and
extent of police protection is best left to political branches. 2 ' The court
referenced Government Code Section 845, passed by the California
Legislature to limit municipal liability, which "'grants a general immunity
for failure to provide police protection or for failure to provide enough
police protection. '" 22 Moreover, the court opined that the California Tort
Claims Act was intended to restrict rather than expand governmental
liability.123 And, in noting the comments of the California Law Revision
Commission, the court commented that the intent of the legislature in
passing the Tort Claims Act was to continue, not withdraw, immunity. 24
The effect of Zelig is that the general no-duty rule applies unless a
special relationship exists, and special relationship in "protection cases" has
been narrowed to situations where police voluntarily assumed a duty to
provide a particular level of protection and failed or undertook an
affirmative act that increased the harm. 125 And "affirmative act" follows the
same logic as "affirmative" when claiming a Fourteenth Amendment
violation by the State. The existence of an order of protection or the
existence of a statutory mandate does not create the duty. Indeed, in
Colorado, the Governmental Immunity Act specifically states that mandates
do not constitute "duty," the necessary predicate that triggers responsibility
on the part of the State.
126
119. Id. at 1184-85, 1191. The California Tort Claims Act shields a municipality from
liability for its own conduct "except as otherwise provided by statute," or where harm occurs
due to a state actor's misconduct that occurred during the scope of his or her employment.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815 (West 1995).
120. 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983).
121. SeeZelig,45P.3dat1181.
122. Id. at 1191 (quoting CAL. LAW REVISION COM. com., 32 WEST'S ANN. Gov. CODE
(1995 ed.) foil. § 845, p. 452); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 845 ("Neither a public entity nor
a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise to
provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to
provide sufficient police protection service.").
123. Zelig, 45 P.3d at 1192.
124. Id. at 1193.
125. See id. at 1183 (stating that a duty may arise if a special relationship exists that
gives someone a right of protection).
126. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-106.5 (2001) ("The adoption of a policy or a
regulation to protect any person's health or safety does not give rise to a duty of care on the
part of the State."). One could argue that mandates are more than an "adoption," of a policy
or regulation, in that it requires specific conduct and, therefore, a duty to act in a proscribed
435
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California and Colorado created statutory mandates that failed to
amend tort claims acts which codified the PDD and conceptions of
qualified sovereign immunity."' As a result the "mandate" in statutory
mandates does not create a duty for state actors to act consonant with the
statutory scheme, whether that scheme is mandatory arrest, reporting or
transport. As Gary Schwartz notes, the expansion of duty, and therefore
negligence claims, has not been replicated in the public sector.
28
The second justification for the PDD and conceptions of immunity
seems misplaced. The shield that protects police was constructed so that
courts would not usurp legislative prerogative, specifically immunity
manner, but I doubt that if the court was aware of this section it would put its imprimatur on
location of a duty.
127. Id.; see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815 (West 1995) (stating that, except as
otherwise provided by statute, "(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such
injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other
person"). New York employs a four-factor test to determine whether police conduct is
actionable in negligence. New York looks at whether (1) the municipality has assumed an
affirmative duty to protect; (2) there is awareness on the part of police that inaction could
lead to harm; (3) there is direct contact between the police and the victim; and (4) the victim
justifiably relied on police promises. All four factors must be present to find a special
relationship. See Cuffy v. City of N.Y., 505 N.E.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. 1987). In contrast,
Minnesota considers four distinct factors to determine whether a duty arises between an
individual citizen and police officer: (1) actual knowledge of the dangerous condition;
(2) whether there was reasonable reliance on the governmental unit's representations and
conduct that caused the person to forego alternatives to protect herself; (3) whether an
ordinance or statute set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of
persons rather than the public as a whole; and (4) whether the governmental unit used due
care to avoid the risk of increasing the harm. Minnesota courts are careful to note that the
factors are not exhaustive nor do they create a "bright line test." See Cracraft v. City of St.
Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806-07 (Minn. 1979); see also Radke v. County of Freeborn,
694 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Minn. 2005) (employing the four factor inquiry articulated in
Cracraft to determine if a special duty existed).
128. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 619, 640-43 (1992) (explaining that courts have
been construing tort liability in a way that has halted its expansion); see also TERRANCE F.
KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE '90s (1990) (discussing Deshaney and
how that decision "casts serious doubts abou the utility of civil rights actions" in the area of
tort liability). One of the most interesting cases which expands duty is Tarasoff v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), which held that mental health professionals have
a duty to warn or to take other reasonable steps to protect a third party when a patient
presents a serious danger of violence to that third party. While the court expanded a duty of
care to parties that were not in any relationship with one another, it failed to include campus
police within the ambit of duty to warn. This is particularly instructive because in Tarasoff,
the campus police were instructed to hold the patient for a psychiatric evaluation to
determine if he should be civilly committed under California law. They did not; instead, the
patient/perpetrator was released, subsequently murdering plaintiff's daughter Tatiana
Tarasoff. Id. at 341.
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statutes such as the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act129 and the
California Tort Claims Act.13° In both of these jurisdictions, however, we
have mandatory arrest statutes, and in the case of California a mandatory
transport protocol implemented by the San Jose Police Department, which
states, "'[o]fficers shall assist victims of domestic violence ... in making
arrangements to transport the victim to an alternative shelter." ' 131  In
relation to mandatory arrest, the legislature has spoken and it requires that
police exercise no other option than arrest. The problem rests with the
legislatures' failure to amend immunity statutes so they comport with the
intent of the mandatory arrest provisions.
Some readers may argue that, in and of itself, imposition of a mandate
does not give rise to a legal duty. Indeed that was the position of the court
in Benavidez v San Jose Police Department.132 In Benavidez, the court
found that the protocol did not create a duty to transport; rather, it could be
used as evidence of a breach, 33and the court of appeals agreed. 34 But this
position defies logic. The common interpretation of "duty" is "what you
have to do," or "responsibility," or "obligation."'' 35 If truth be told, "duty" is
synonymous with "must' 136 or its statutory equivalent "shall.' ' 137  No
attempt at obfuscation will alter or change its meaning, even if attempted by
a state trial court or the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, the Colorado
129. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.5 (2004).
130. CAL. GOV'TCODE § 815 (West 1995).
131. See Benavidez v. San Jose Police Dept., 84 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160-61 (noting that
Benavidez testified in a declaration in opposition to defendant's motion for summary
judgment that she specifically asked to be taken to a shelter, but the police officers did not
respond to her inquiry) (quoting the 1993 City of San Jose Police Duty Manual and the
Police Chiefs' Domestic Violence Protocol for Law Enforcement); see also SAN JOSE POLICE
DEP'T, GENERAL ORDER [ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE] § L2194.40 (1986) (on file with author);
G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and
Conceptions of Accountability, 23 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 137-42 (2000) [hereinafter
Miccio, Notes] (discussing the Benavidez case).
132. See Benavidez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167 (finding no special relationship existed
requiring the police to protect the victim from Benavidez).
133. See Miccio, Notes, supra note 131, at 141-42 (discussing the three factors used by
the trial court).
134. See Benavidez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159, 167 (explaining that without a finding of a
special relationship the police owe no duty to the victim and without a duty to breach, there
can be no cause of action for negligence).
135. ROGET'S II THENEW THESAURUS 317 (3rd ed. 1995).
136. Id.
137. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1143 (8th ed. 2005) (stating the definition of
"shall" as "has a duty to").
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Legislature understood this when it specifically included the "no duty
proviso" as part of its Governmental Immunity Act.'38
The justification that underlies the various configurations of immunity
is antithetical to the conceptions of responsibility that frame statutory
mandates. It is time that we either reject immunity or mandates because as
it now stands, the existence of both renders mandates unenforceable
regardless of whether battered women seek redress in federal or state court.
As Deborah Rhode notes and the Supreme Court acknowledges, "the right
to sue and defend in the courts... is the right conservative of all other
rights and lies at the foundation of orderly government."'139 In 2009, this
right is lost to women and children battered by husbands, fathers and
paramours... and by an irresponsible system.
IV The Battered Women's Movement (BWM): Morally and Politically
Purposeless.
On March 20, 2009, a reunion of sorts was held at St. John's Law
School, which brought together the leading feminist scholars and law
professors during the past thirty years who have influenced theory and the
law on male intimate violence cases. In attendance were the first
generation, Professors Sarah Buel, Donna Coker, Holly Maguigan,
Elizabeth Schneider, and advocate, lawyer, and writer Joan Zorza; the
second generation, Professor Cheryl Hanna, Elaine Chiu, Emily Sack, and
myself; and the third generation, represented by Professor Carolyn
Bettinger-Lopez. The purpose of the conference was to "think outside the
box" and to discuss possible strategies to combat domestic violence in the
twenty-first century. I was proud and humbled to be part of this group,
many of whom were mentors and role models as I moved through law
school and up the academic food chain.
In the Belson Moot Court Room on March 20th were the scholars who
crafted workable defenses for the women who fought back,140 raised the
importance of a coordinated community response to male intimate
138. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.5 (2004) (making explicit that a "public
employee shall not be deemed to have assumed a duty of care where none otherwise existed
by the performance of a service or an act of assistance for the benefit of any person").
139. Chambers v. Bait. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also Deborah
Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1785, 1799 (2001) (quoting Chambers, 207
U.S. at 148).
140. Professors Elizabeth Schneider and Holly Maguigan.
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violence, 141 brought to life prosecution strategies within the framework of
due process,142 created a new legal standard in child protective proceedings
when battered women were charged with failure to protect for failure to
stop the abuse to themselves, 143 developed a new paradigm for the use of
international law in homegrown male intimate violence cases, 44 crafted
federal, state, and local legislation aimed at abating male intimate
violence, 145 and infused accountability into statutory schemes. 46  These
women were instrumental in creating legal doctrine, strategy, and public
policy that put male intimate violence on the political as well as the legal
radar screen. And, they brought their work into the classroom by
developing courses and casebooks on domestic violence, law, morality, and
accountability and conceptions of social justice.
Why do I feel a need to tell this story? Because all of us had to admit,
on this day in March 2009, that we are still discussing the same issues
raised in the 1970s-perhaps with more sophistication-but identical
issues, all the same. And we faced the sad fact that the BWM is morally
and politically adrift, or perhaps-purposeless.
What happened?
A. From Radical Feminists to Agents and Agencies of the State: Or How a
Movement Was Transformed into a Network of Social Service Agencies
In Part II, I introduced the reader to a brief history of the BWM. One
needs to understand the historical moorings of this movement to grasp how
it has regressed, or at the very least, lost its all-important political "edge"
and relevancy.
The BWM 1 4 7 was the product of the social movements of the 1960s
that challenged conceptions of power based on race, sex, and sexual
141. Professors Donna Coker and Sarah Buel.
142. Professors Cheryl Hanna and Sarah Buel.
143. Professor Kris Miccio.
144. Professor Carolyn Bettinger-Lopez.
145. Professors Schneider, Maguigan, Coker, Buel, Miccio, Hanna, and Zorza.
146. Professor Miccio.
147. I am well aware of the complexity of the women's movement in general and the
battered women's movement in particular. The mere fact that the ideological basis spans an
enormous political spectrum demonstrates its textured nature. Notwithstanding this political
reality, there is a thread that unites all of the ideologies-the existence of patriarchy as a
macro-organizing force. It should also be noted that though the early movement
incorporated a race analysis, it did not consistently address this issue in its methodology.
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orientation. 148  This movement was integral to the women's liberation
movement because it challenged male hegemony over women's bodies in
the home. It made the personal very political and blurred the cultural and
legal distinction between "public and "private" while developing an
ideology that contested the appropriation of women's bodies, challenged
conceptions of male supremacy in the family, and analyzed how the
individual power of the patriarch was supported and legitimized by the
state. 49 In other words, it exploded the myth that the family was a safe
Though there were shelters that addressed ethnic and racial asymmetry, such as La Casa de
Las Madres, Casa Myrna Vazquez, which was started by a multiracial group of women in
Boston, there was not a coherent ethnic or racial analysis regarding shelter organization;
shelters' methodologies constituted staff, programs, and selection of issues. As the shelters
became "professionalized," the chasm between methodology and a race-ethnic
consciousness widened. Yet it is incorrect to characterize the battered women's movement
as a white women's movement. This notion is incorrect because it makes invisible the
women of color who were instrumental in its formation and because it marginalizes those
women within the movement who struggled over conceptions of ideological and
methodological inclusivity. Finally, women-of-color groups that addressed issues of gender
asymmetry in the ethnic civil rights movement and racism in the women's movement
influenced the discourse. The Combahee River Collective (Collective), perhaps the most
notable of the women-of-color groups, challenged conceptions of patriarchy and race on
such issues as intimate violence, abortion rights, and sterilization abuse. The Collective was
comprised of black lesbian feminists, but unlike the white lesbian separatist feminists of that
era, the Collective did not align with the politics of separatism. Instead, it built alliances
with progressive black men in addressing issues of gender, class, and racial violence. The
Collective served as a powerful reminder of the connections between race, ethnicity, and
gender in the oppression of women and ethnic minorities. Indeed, Kimberle Crenshaw's
work on "intersectionality," is neither new nor novel; it is in fact derivative of the theoretical
framework first articulated by the women in the Combahee River Collective. See The
Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND
THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 362, 365-66 (Zillah R. Eisenstein ed., 1979) (describing
the Combahee River Collective's beliefs); see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1262-65 (1991) (asserting that shelters marginalize battered minority
women because of the shelters' focus on the dominant racial group); SCHECHTER, supra note
11, at 61 (describing the shelter's kitchen as an emotional battlefield of racial mixing).
148. GLORIA I. JOSEPH & JILL LEWIS, COMMON DIFFERENCES: CONFLICTS IN BLACK AND
WHITE FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 63-65 (1981); Dale Carpenter, The Limits of Gaylaw, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 603, 612-13 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW:
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)); Deb Friedman, Rape, Racism &
Reality, 5 QUEST: A FEMINIST Q. 40, 40-41 (Summer 1979); Selma James, Sex, Race and
Working Class Power, in SEX, RACE AND CLASS 9, 9 (1975) (on file with author); Third
World Women: The Politics of Being Other, 2 HERESIES: A FEMINIST PUBLICATION ON ART
& POL. 1 (1979) (on file with Author); E. Francis White, Listening to the Voices of Black
Feminism, 18 RADICAL AM. 7, 7-9 (1984).
149. Diversity of thought within the feminist movement in general, and the battered
women's movement in particular, is striking. Differences of thought were distributed along
a political spectrum that included liberal, socialist, Marxist, radical, and lesbian feminism.
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haven for women and children and it made this violence a political and
cultural issue.
The nucleus or backbone of the BWM was the shelters. In fact, it
would be fair to characterize the BWM as a shelter movement. Susan
Schechter in her ground breaking book published in 1982,150 documents the
phenomenon commonly referred to as the shelter movement; and not unlike
the rape crisis movement of the early 1970s, the BWM understood that
safety and individual and systemic accountability were important
components of any political strategy. Moreover, by situating male intimate
violence within a cultural paradigm, the battered women's movement
focused on altering the social conditions that produced, created, and
supported such abuse. In the lexicon of the early movement, what needed
fixing was not the survivor but the culture. Shelter programs and the
nascent coalitions that formed in the late 1970s and early 1980s crafted an
agenda that focused on social as well as legal change.'
51
It is fascinating that the early shelters survived, much less thrived,
since they were cash poor and lacked a sound funding base. Shelters were
See generally FEMINIST THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY (Nannerl 0. Keohane et al. eds.,
1982) (compiling essays about feminist theory spanning several systems of thought). Each
ideological category constructed a political paradigm that located the source of women's
subordination as either a consequence of rights inequality, class, control of capital or the
means of '[re]production, or sex hegemony." Yet, all of the ideological positions included
patriarchy as either constitutive of, or in collaboration with, other social categories in the
subordination of women. Thus, regardless of label, patriarchy was a critical component of
women's oppression.
150. See SCHECHTER, supra note 11 and accompanying text and accompanying text.
151. Coalitions sprang up nationwide. Of particular interest were coalitions in New
York, Colorado, and Illinois. The Chicago Abused Women's Coalition (CAWC) started a
legal newsletter that identified gender asymmetry in law enforcement. See SCHECTER, supra
note 11, at 71 (describing the CAWC and its effect on gender asymmetry in law
enforcement). Additionally, in the first two years of its existence, CAWC spoke to hundreds
of community groups, women's organizations, and professional agencies. Id. Their
presentations attempted to dispel the myths of survivor blaming, to identify the broader
social conditions that created the abuse, and to challenge mental health professionals to
avoid pathologizing women's choices. Id. The Coalition of Battered Women's Advocates
of New York City and the New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence began
lobbying legislators to change laws that restricted court access to women. See NEW YORK
STATE COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABOUT THE COALITION, available at
http://www.nyscadv.org/about.htm (highlighting public policy services that promote judicial
responses to domestic violence). The Colorado Coalition (Denver) began to work with local
law enforcement in examining unequal treatment of battered women by police. See Co.
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING MANUAL v-vi (2d
ed., 2003), available at http://www.ccadv.org/publications/lawenforcement-manual_11-
03.pdf (recalling that police treated domestic violence less seriously than other crimes in the
past).
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funded by community members who donated cash, clothing, furniture, and
food.152 Shelter workers were often formerly battered women who staffed
programs, drawing upon their expertise as battered women. Thus,
credentials were not an M.S.W or a law degree; credentials were acquired
via the school of hard knocks. Battered women taught each other and they
taught us-the advocates who fell outside the ambit of their collective
experience.
For example, Women's Advocates, a shelter program in St. Paul,
Minnesota, emerged from a consciousness-raising (CR) group, in which
participants felt the need to "do something" for battered women. 53 The
women in the CR group first developed legal materials to instruct women
on what to do if battered.154 Then, armed with individual pledges of $350
from women throughout the community, the CR group rented a small
apartment for sheltering battered women and their children. 55 Fifteen-
hundred miles away, in New York, women opened their apartments and
convinced others to do the same in establishing a number of safe houses to
shelter women and their children.'56  This cluster of apartments
subsequently became Sanctuary for Families, one of the largest shelter
programs in New York State and nationally.
Safe homes sprang up across the United States throughout rural, urban,
and suburban America. Not unlike the underground railroad of the
nineteenth century, advocates, many of whom were formerly battered
women, created a network of individual safe homes to help women escape
the violence and oppression that had defined their lives.
The advocates turned to women within their community for economic,
social, emotional, and political support.'57 What was characteristic about
the movement at this stage of development was its self-reliance.
Community women created the power base for shelters. Power was derived
152. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 189 (1987) (stating that
in addition to these things, community members also donated office space); SCHECHTER,
supra note 11, at 62-63.
153. Id. at 62.
154. See id. (describing the legal materials and the grants received to create them).
155. See id. at 62-63 (describing the sources of funding).
156. Telephone Interview with the late Sarah Burke, first Board President, Sanctuary
For Families, Inc. (Summer 2004).
157. Advocates were also unwilling to accept state funds due to state approbation of
male intimate violence and concern over issues of co-option and control. This became a key
issue as the movement developed politically and organizationally. See SCHECHTER, supra
note 11, at 93-98 (discussing the "mixed blessing" of money).
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from the group, and in this way women learned a unique lesson: power was
generative, relational, and defining-both individually and collectively. '
5 8
I do not idealize the early shelters. I recognize that shelter workers
and residents clashed over internal politics, ideological positions, and
cultural questions particular to ethnicity and class. Yet the methodology
employed did much to "empower" women, regardless of role, ethnicity, or
class. 5 9 And unlike the modern shelters, professional credentials were not
a proxy for effectiveness as a shelter staff member. There was real
currency in being a survivor. Survivors supported, taught, encouraged,
challenged, and cajoled one another. More importantly, survivors
performed the same tasks as workers in configuring shelter life. Women's
self-determination, a key organizing principle, was practiced through the
egalitarian traditions employed by the advocates.
Yet such equality would be sacrificed in the latter part of the twentieth
century. 16  With the influx of money from federal, state and local
governments, the shelters experienced both an ideological and
methodological shift. Additionally, "once the issue of battering gained
legitimacy and funding was made available, more established organizations
took over the issue grassroots women had worked so hard to raise.'
61
The shelters formed by a feminist politic were forced to abandon the
non-hierarchical paradigm that shaped organizing principles. Decision
making would be vested in a Board of Directors and an Executive Director.
Consensus and shared decision making among workers and residents were
shelved. As a result, residents were transformed into "clients" with no
158. See DONILEEN R. LOSEKE, THE BATTERED WOMAN AND SHELTERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WIFE ABUSE 29-30, 149-151, 154 (1992) (exploring the relationship
between unique individuals and the collective representation of the "battered woman").
159. The early shelters were often plagued by internecine struggles involving ideology
and strategy. Because the feminist shelters stressed consensus, such struggles were
corollaries of structural dynamics. Additionally, as Pleck correctly emphasizes, the most
radical shelters oftentimes collapsed because of limited finances and no viable funding
stream. Inadequate funding was a consequence of the political nature of the shelters, not of
shelter politics. See PLECK, supra note 15, at 190-93 (examining the transition of the first
shelters from self-help organizations to social agencies).
160. Id. at 190-94 (illustrating how the involvement of private and governmental
funding sources, in tum, contributed to the conservatization of shelter ideology and
methodology).
161. Id. at 75; see also Lois Ahrens, Battered Women's Refuges: Feminist Cooperative
vs. Social Service Institution, 3 RADICAL Am. 41, 44-47 (1980) (arguing that the new
"'professionalized' social service institution [was] divorced from the community" and had
failed to consider the "societal, cultural, and political implications of why women are the
ones in the family so often beaten").
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decision making power and workers were turned into staff, with limited
decision making power. And workers who lacked traditional credentials,
such as social work degrees, were either demoted or let go. The
hierarchical or corporate model of governance was the key organizing
principle, principally dictated by the funding agencies. Egalitarianism was
replaced by hierarchy, and political purpose was replaced by psychological
imperatives. Not unlike traditional social service agencies, the shelters
reinterpreted women's needs to be problems of "low self-esteem," and not
the far-reaching claims for the social and economic prerequisites of
independence.
The shelters had lost their historical and political moorings, and such
dislocation altered a movement's vision. Put another way, the BWM had
been co-opted.
2. Colorado as Case in Point
The Colorado battered women's community has not addressed the
issues that Castle Rock raises. It has not had a discussion about state
accountability, the effect of mandates, the Governmental Immunity Act, or
the construction of the mandatory arrest statute passed by the Colorado
Legislature in 1994. All of these issues are critical to conceptions of
protection of battered women and their children. But Colorado is not alone.
There haven't been meaningful, or even non-meaningful, discussions about
Castle Rock in the various state coalitions or the National Coalition.
"hy?
In 2007, a conference call took place among scholars and
representatives of various state coalitions. During the call, questions about
the Castle Rock case were raised; specifically, what were the plans of the
various coalitions regarding the cultural reading of the U.S. Supreme Court
decision, namely the unenforceability of mandates? 62  All of the
representatives responded that the case was "difficult," "hard to
understand," and the discussion was aborted.
I would agree with my sisters that this case is difficult. I would also
agree that the position of the Court in Castle Rock is difficult to understand
in light of the legislative history, both at the state and federal levels,
concerning mandates in domestic violence cases. I would also concur that
162. I was one of the advocates-turned-scholars who participated in the conference call.
I also raised the issue concerning Castle Rock
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planning a political strategy is both complex and intricate. Yet none of the
reasons put forth legitimize doing nothing.
Indeed, it took one hundred and forty years to enfranchise women and
give us a political voice. The fact that the women's vote was attacked by
the Church, the State, and powerful folks did not deter the suffragists from
taking on this issue. Women marched, went on hunger strikes, were beaten,
jailed, and ostracized because they dared to defy what American society
believed was the "natural order of things" as ordained by Divine
Ordinance. 163
Those women, and kindred men, transformed conceptions of gender
and the appropriate role of men and women in the family and the body
politic. This was truly a cultural revolution where sex/gender roles were
reconstituted.
During the Second Wave of Feminism, the feminists of the '60s took
the work started by the suffragists a step further. Regardless of their
ideological positions, Second Wave feminists challenged pre-ordained
values that structured cultural, political, economic, and social roles. The
Marxist/Socialist Feminists challenged Marx's conclusion that housework
was non-productive because it was non-wage labour.' 64 As a result, the
Congress of Neighborhood Women and the group 9-5 advocated for wages
for housework. The Radical Feminists challenged patriarchy as an
organizing principle in the home, in the labour market, and in politics by
setting up women (womyn) only communes, businesses, and publishing
houses.' 65 The Liberal Feminists contested gender asymmetry in pay by
advocating for comparable worth. 16 6 All challenged male hegemony in the
family and the right to violence accorded males in our culture.
163. Bradwell v Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) see also Muller v Oregon. 208 U.S.
412, 426 (1908) ("That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious."); BILL
SEVERN, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL: How WOMEN WON THE RIGHT TO VOTE 74-77 (1967).
164. See generally BATYA WEINBAUM, THE CURIOUS COURTSHIP OF WOMEN'S
LIBERATION AND SOCIALISM (3d ed. 1999).
165. The Kate Millet space constructed in upstate NY is an example of a commune,
while Olivia Records and Olivia Cruises are examples of women-owned businesses.
166. I have named just a few areas contested by the Second Wave feminists. There
were challenges to Freudian Psychology, to the architects of women's body (such as Michel
Foucault), and to the portrayal of women in advertising. For more on this subject, see JULIET
MITCHELL & SANGAY K. MISHRA, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM: A RADICAL
REASSESSMENT OF FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS (2d ed. 2000). See also JANA SAWICKI,
DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER AND THE BODY (1991).
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During the Second Wave of Feminism, the Women's Liberation
Movement took the standard from the suffragists and forced policy changes
that affected collective thought and conduct in relation to women in the
home and in the body politic. Not unlike their sisters and brothers in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, members of the Women's Liberation
and Battered Women's Movements were ridiculed, jailed, and in some
instances raped and murdered for their beliefs and for their political
activism.
Difficult? Hell yes!
So why have we become passive and dismissive? First, the co-
optation of the shelters has had a profound effect on political organizing
and strategizing. For many in the BWM, the issue of economic support
from the government or from private foundations lacking in a feminist
politic was cited as the chief reason for the ideological shift. 67 Quite
simply, one does not bite the hand that feeds. While this is definitely an
issue, it carries no weight in Colorado, because the Colorado Legislature
gives not a dime to DV shelters. And while Colorado advocates support a
bill that would funnel money to their programs, in this economic climate
such a bill will be hard pressed to pass during the 2008-2009 legislative
session. The "don't bite the hand that feeds you" excuse is a non-starter, at
least in Colorado.
It seems that advocates in Colorado, at least those still willing to talk
about Castle Rock, believe that taking on the Governmental Immunity Act
is politically unfeasible. If this was the standard that guided feminists from
the first or second wave, I doubt that I would be a professor at a law school,
or an "out" lesbian or even a former prosecutor from the Bronx District
Attorney's Office. Surely, gender roles, sex-role stereotyping, repeal of
marital rape exemptions, and criminalization of male intimate violence
would be aspirational.
If political feasibility was the yardstick that guided political activism,
we would be hard pressed to believe that an African-American would be
able to sit in the front of the bus, much less ascend to the presidency. And
it is doubtful that mining companies, nuclear power plants, or white collar
offices would give a thought to occupational safety issues on the job. And
if feasibility governed political action, the labor union, women's liberation,
racial/ethnic liberation, and gay/lesbian/bi-sexual/transgendered liberation
movements would be illusory as opposed to a real part of United States
167. Discussion with advocates in New York, California, and Colorado in the summer
of 2005.
446
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history. All of these movements crafted political agendas and actions that
were difficult and unfeasible because they contested the roots of racial,
ethnic, sexual, gender, and class asymmetry in our lives and our laws. They
contested what Howard Zinn characterized as the web of power.
68
Political activism carries with it risk: the risk of damage to one's
reputation, loss of acceptance from or approbation by the power brokers,
and perhaps exile to a cultural gulag. The feminists and suffragists from the
past recognized and acknowledged this reality. They persevered, however,
because achieving women's liberation from homes marked by terror or
accomplishing access and parity in male-dominated occupations was more
important than individual recognition or approbation by the state. To these
feminists, "failure was impossible" because attainment of the political goals
that defined a movement was of greater importance. In 2009, we have
become risk-averse or perhaps identified too closely with the power elite.
As a result, our moral and political compass is skewed.
Susan B. Anthony, Sojourner Truth, Audre Lorde, and Florence
Kennedy would be ashamed of us. Why? Because after Castle Rock, our
silence marginalizes violence against women by male intimate partners and
transforms Jessica Gonzales' pain into purposelessness.
V. If Not Now, When?
"When I dare to be powerful, to use my strength in the service of my
vision, then it becomes less important whether or not I am unafraid."
' 169
The BWM needs a new feminist vision that honors our past while
transforming our future. By honoring our past, I am referencing our
understanding of patriarchal power in the home and in civil society. How
this power is actualized is through intimate violence in the home and lack
of accountability by the state for the perpetuation of male intimate violence.
This contextualizes the violence and correctly frames it as the confluence of
individual and state action. Jill Burella, Jessica Gonzales, and Adela
Benevidez were harmed by the actions of their husbands/boyfriends and by
the state. And our message? The state does not get a pass because of the
ignoble tradition of non-accountability protected by sovereign immunity,
the PDD, or a negative rights interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
168. See generally, HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-
PRESENT (2003) (telling the stories of the American people whose beliefs and actions set
them apart from the perceived common culture of the United States).
169. AUDRE LORD, THE CANCER JOURNALS 15 (1980).
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Accountability is not the moral, legal, or political equivalent of
unfettered state power. Rather, it forces the state to account for its conduct.
Within the context of mandatory arrest, accountability demands
responsibility for choosing to abide by or to ignore statutory or
departmental mandates. How the state should be held accountable is both a
local and national issue.
Regardless of jurisdiction, however, abatement of the violence,
adherence to due process standards, and protection of women's autonomy
and lives should be the overall guiding principles. And if our principles
force us to reevaluate the efficacy of statutory mandates, we must be
willing to engage this process. Consequently, the BWM needs to account
for its political, legal, and cultural choices.
By transforming our future, the BWM's vision should accommodate a
critique of generic violence in our culture. Violence against women by
male intimate partners is merely part of the violence that defines our
culture. The Second Wave feminists understood this and linked violence
against women to the violence of poverty; 170 the violence of sex role
stereotyping; 17 1 the violence of war and United States imperialism;.72 the
violence of racism, sexism, homophobia, and classism; 173 and finally the
violence of enforced silence and invisibility. 
74
170. See The Combahee River Collective, supra note 147; FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY:
ONLY IN AMERICA? (Gertrude Schaffer Goldberg & Eleanor Kremen eds., 1990) (looking at
intersections of poverty and gender from global perspectives); see also JEAN BAKER MILLER,
TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (2d ed. 1986) (stressing the need to fundamentally
reevaluate how women see themselves and re-conceptualize the understanding of male and
females roles).
171. See also WILLIAM POLLACK, REAL BOYS RESCUING OUR SONS FROM THE MYTHS OF
BOYHOOD (1999) (challenging the conventions of raising boys through a toughening process,
instead promoting a fuller development of emotional maturity). See generally MILLER, supra
note 170.
172. See ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, HATREDS: RACIALIZED AND SEXUALIZED CONFLICTS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (1996) (exploring the politics of war and hatred, especially as it relates to
ethnic conflicts and the post-Communist landscape); FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE
MASKS (Charles L. Markmann trans., 1967) (framing the concept of a black psyche in a
white world).
173. See SIMON DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., 1953)
(containing an exhaustive analysis of woman as Other and the violence this conception
engenders); see also BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE: ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE
BLACKS ARE MEN: BLACK WOMEN STUDIES (Gloria T. Hull et. al. trans., 1982) (exploring
the integration of race/gender analyses); CHARLOTTE BUNCH, LESBIANISM AND THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT (1975) (examining the inclusion/exclusion of lesbians in the women's
movement); CHARLOTTE BUNCH, PASSIONATE POLITICS: FEMINIST THEORY IN ACTION (1987)
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174. See TILLE OLSEN, SILENCES (1978) (exploring how marginalization of people
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MALE INTIMATE VIOLENCE
If the BWM decides to develop a more comprehensive politic, which
explores and contests state sanctioned violence in both the home and civil
society, it will need to understand the roots of such violence. As
MacKinnon notes, war, poverty, sexual slavery, intimate violence, and the
"-isms," are formed by, and formative of, a culture where power is denied
to the many and the exclusive province of the few. 175  And axes of
domination are constructed by race, class, gender, and sexual orientation.
The subordinate/dominant paradigm is about power and it is along this fault
line of power that a patriarchal right to violence in the family is constructed.
Taking MacKinnon's theory a step further, when the state allows male
intimate violence to remain unchallenged, it operates as a cultural
accomplice to the violence. At the very least, it is a cause of the harm
suffered by women and their children.
To reclaim its place among purposeful social and political movements,
the BWM must commit to contesting state power whenever that power is
used to subordinate women, and in a broader sense, whenever the state
chooses to use its power as a means of social control. Yet, crossing
ideological boundaries is difficult and a contested strategy. During the
second wave of feminism, there was some resistance to integrating a
race/class/gender analysis into feminist ideology and methodology.
176
Feminist theorists located women's oppression in patriarchy. 7 7  But
patriarchal power could not and did not explain the subordination of people
based on race or class or sexual orientation. Indeed, Patricia Williams is
correct when she claims that we are not partialized, but the sum of our
parts, demonstrating how our race, class, gender, and sexual orientation
combine to either oppress and marginalize or empower.178 Understanding
violence against women in the home requires an acknowledgment of how
based on gender, sex, class, and race operates to silence.); see also KATE MILLET, SExuAL
POLITICS (1970) (discussing sexism in literature).
175. See generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW (1987); CATHERINE MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES MEN'S LAWS (2007);
CATHERINE MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES
(2007).
176. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the second wave feminism).
177. See supra Part IV.A.2.
178. See generally PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991);
see also G. Kristian Miccio, Closing my Eyes and Remembering Myself: Reflections of a
Lesbian Law Professor, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167 (1997) (reflecting on how sexual
orientation and the law have collided and discussing the lessons that have been drawn from
this collision).
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the -isms create a violent paradigm that harms both the "I" and the
collective "we."
Methodologically, we need to build alliances with organizations
committed to ending violence in our homes and in our communities. I
know this is a tall order, but if we choose to remain ideologically and
organizationally insular, we will not begin to address those issues that affect
battered women from communities of color or communities where poverty,
underemployment, street violence, or the effects of war sap the strength and
vitality of all women, men, and children. It is time to not only show the
connections but to contest the underlying assumptions about power that
distort our lives.
And finally, we must dare to be powerful, use our strength, and work
for our vision; if we do, we will not be afraid because we will become the
leaders we have been waiting for.
NOTES

